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NOTE
GARCIA v. GOOGLE, INC.: THE NINTH
CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL TO EXTEND
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION TO
AN ACTOR’S PERFORMANCE,
REINFORCING THE LETTER
OF COPYRIGHT LAW
ANNA NICOLOPULOS
INTRODUCTION
In the technological world we live in, becoming a worldwide phe-
nomenon is happening more frequently. With the advent of YouTube,1
accessible in more than seventy countries and with hundreds of hours of
video uploaded every minute,2 many actors and filmmakers hope their
videos will emerge as worldwide internet sensations, perhaps overnight.
Few people, however, want their videos to spark worldwide political
controversy, which is exactly what happened with a user upload in the
summer of 2012. Innocence of Muslims was released on YouTube on
July 2, 2012, and its content was so controversial it sparked a political
uproar in the Middle East.
Innocence of Muslims was an anti-Islamic film that depicted the
Prophet Mohammed “as a homosexual son of undetermined patrimony,
who rises to advocate child slavery and extramarital sex, for himself, in
the name of religion.”3 Muslims throughout the world were outraged
1 About YouTube, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/about (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
2 Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited Sept. 28,
2015).
3 The Obscure Anti-Islam Film that Sparked Egyptian and Libyan Riots: A guide,
THEWEEK.COM (Sept. 12, 2012), http://theweek.com/article/index/233239/the-obscure-anti-muslim-
film-that-sparked-egyptian-and-libyan-riots-a-guide.
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50 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
with this depiction and riots ensued throughout the Middle East, causing
an Egyptian cleric to issue a fatwa4 calling for anyone involved in the
film to be killed.5
In February 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit6
issued an injunction against Google,7 the company that owns YouTube,
to have the video permanently removed from the site.8 The court did not
issue the injunction in response to the political upheaval or any lawsuit
against the film’s creator. Instead, this decision granted an actor, Cindy
Lee Garcia, who appeared in the film for five seconds, a copyright inter-
est in the film. This interest was so deeply rooted that Google was forced
to remove the entire film from YouTube and take action to prevent any
further uploads.
Copyright protection is rooted in the Intellectual Property Clause of
the United States Constitution,9 which sets boundaries for the subject
matter that can be protected by federal copyright law.10 The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s 2014 decision in Garcia v. Google, Inc.,11 marked the first time a
court ruled that an individual actor with a minor role in a film has a
copyright interest in her own performance.12
In Garcia v. Google, Inc., the Ninth Circuit originally held that the
actor likely had a copyright interest in the film because she was “duped
into providing an artistic performance that was used in a way she never
could have foreseen.”13  The court reasoned that Garcia established she
was likely to succeed on her copyright claim due to the serious threats
against her life, and the balance of the equities and public interest that
were in her favor.14 The Ninth Circuit applied the standard for a
mandatory preliminary injunction and found that Garcia, as an actor, had
4 Definition of Fatwa, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
fatwa (last visited Sep. 28, 2015). A fatwaˆ is a legal opinion provided by an Islamic religious leader.
5 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 786 F.3d 933 (9th Cir.
2015) (en banc).
6 2-1- The U.S. Federal Judicial System, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManu-
als/RegulatoryProceduresManual/ucm176577.htm (last visited Oct 3, 2015). The Ninth Circuit is the
largest court of appeals in the nation with 28 active judgeships and comprising a fifth of the nation’s
states.
7 About Google, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
8 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 932.
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10 Id. (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
11 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015)
(en banc).
12 The Annals of Copyright Number 1, BOWLES LAW, http://www.tbowleslaw.com/the-annals-
of-copyright-no-1 (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
13 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 940.
14 Id.
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2016] Garcia v. Google, Inc. 51
a copyright interest in the film because she evinced a minimal degree of
creativity in her performance.15
The court should have only ruled that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to grant Garcia’s copyright interest, if the facts and
law clearly favored issuing a preliminary injunction.16 The court as-
sumed Garcia was an author and created its own law to provide her — as
an actor — a copyright interest in a film.  Nothing about Garcia’s per-
formance or what she demonstrated provide that the facts and the law
“clearly favor her claim of a copyrightable interest” in her acting per-
formance.17 The court demanded YouTube remove the film, a request
that was subjected to the incorrect degree of scrutiny.18 The court should
have applied a higher degree of scrutiny and reversed the district court’s
decision only if the decision was illogical or implausible.19 Garcia did
not clearly satisfy the requirements to claim copyright infringement, thus
the district court’s decision was not illogical or implausible, and the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion.
This Note focuses on the Ninth Circuit’s original failure to apply the
correct standard of review, its misapplication of the elements of copy-
right, its rectification of these failures, and possible remedies that exist
outside of copyright. The Ninth Circuit originally decided that Garcia’s
performance in five seconds of a film was too minimally creative to pro-
vide her a copyright interest that warranted the removal of the entire
film. The decision resulted in mixed opinions and several petitions to the
Ninth Circuit to rehear the matter. The Ninth Circuit granted the en banc
review in November 2014 and released its opinion in May 2015.20  Upon
review of the case, the en banc court restored the intention of copyright
law and affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction,
because the law and facts did not clearly favor Garcia’s claim for a copy-
right interest in her acting performance as it appeared in Innocence of
Muslims.21 The Ninth Circuit en banc opinion vacated its 2014 decision,
and held that Garcia did not satisfy the requirements to establish a likeli-
hood of success on the merits and that she was not entitled to a prelimi-
nary injunction.22
Part I of this Note presents a background of the factual history of the
case and the relevant history of copyright law. Part II focuses on the
15 Id. at 933?34.
16 Id. at 940 (Smith, J., dissenting).
17 Id. at 946.
18 Id. at 940?41.
19 Id. at 940.
20 Garcia v. Google, Inc. 786 F.3d 733, 739 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
21 Id. at 737.
22 Id. at 744.
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procedural history of Garcia v. Google, Inc., focusing on the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s misapplication of copyright law and the en banc court’s restoration
of copyright law’s intention. Part III presents possible remedies that Gar-
cia may have had outside of an action asserted under copyright law. The
Note concludes by emphasizing that the expansion of technology could
have substantial implications for copyright interests, and that such expan-
sion may force the United States to adopt more specific laws going
forward.
I. FACTUAL HISTORY BEHIND GARCIA V. GOOGLE, INC. AND HISTORY
OF COPYRIGHT
In July 2012, Mark Basseley Youssef uploaded a fourteen-minute
trailer23 of his film Innocence of Muslims to YouTube,24 which sparked
protests that generated worldwide news coverage.25 The film aired on
Egyptian television in the summer of 2012 and sparked protests through-
out the country, ultimately leading to an Egyptian cleric issuing a fatwa,
calling for all those involved in the film to be killed.26
What could be so controversial in a fourteen-minute video to spark
this worldwide controversy? Youssef hired several actors and cast mem-
bers to work on the movie, which he represented as a film about “an
ancient tribal villain named George” titled Desert Warriors.27  Once the
movie was completed, Youssef dubbed the name “Mohammad” anytime
someone said the name “George.”28 According to his son, Youssef
“fooled” the actors and cast members because he knew this would be a
controversial film and he did not reveal the correct information “as a
precaution for their safety.”29
This “safety concern” is exactly what prompted a controversial cop-
yright case. Actor Garcia accepted a minor part with four pages of script,
23 J. Alexander Lawrence, Google Ordered to Remove All Copies of Anti-Islamic Film From
YouTube; Decision Puzzles Copyright Attorneys, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP (Apr. 1, 2014), http://
www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/303656/Copyright/Google+Ordered+To+Remove+All+Copies+
Of+AntiIslamic+Film+From+Youtube+After+Actress+With+Bit+Part+Threatened+By+Outraged+
Muslims‡ecision+Puzzles+Copyright+Attorneys.
24 Id.
25 Garcia v. Google. Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir.
2015) (en banc).
26 Id.
27 Serge F. Kovaleski & Brooks Barnes, From Man Who Insulted Muhammad, No Regret,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/us/from-the-man-who-insulted-is
lam-no-retreat.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0.
28 Id.
29 Id.
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol46/iss1/8
37275-ggl_46-1 Sheet No. 43 Side A      01/13/2016   11:44:49
37275-ggl_46-1 Sheet No. 43 Side A      01/13/2016   11:44:49
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GGL\46-1\GGL104.txt unknown Seq: 5 29-DEC-15 11:15
2016] Garcia v. Google, Inc. 53
in the film she thought was titled Desert Warrior.30 Garcia was filmed
for three and a half days and was paid about $500.00 for her part.31
Garcia saw the film Innocence of Muslims for the first time on YouTube,
though her five second performance was dubbed over so that her charac-
ter asked, “Is your Mohammed a child molester?”32 Understandably,
many Muslims around the world were offended, and after protests and
riots ensued, Garcia received death threats.33 In response, Garcia filed
eight takedown orders pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA).34  Google refused to remove the trailer, and in September
2012, Garcia sued Google asserting that her copyright interest had been
infringed.35  In October 2012, she moved for a preliminary injunction to
have all copies of the movie removed from YouTube.36  In November
2012, the district court denied Garcia’s motion claiming her short per-
formance was unlikely to lead to a copyright interest, she delayed too
long in seeking the injunction after first viewing the trailer, and she did
not meet the high standard necessary to obtain a mandatory preliminary
injunction.37
Although the district court refused to grant the injunction in Garcia
v. Google, Inc.,38 the Ninth Circuit ordered the video’s removal even
though it found Garcia’s copyright interest was “doubtful.”39 The Ninth
Circuit reviewed the “denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of dis-
cretion” of the district court, but it reviewed “the legal premises underly-
ing a preliminary injunction” de novo.40
30 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 786 F.3d. 733 (9th Cir.
2015) (en banc).
31 Id.
32 David Kluft, Nine Thoughts On the Ninth Circuit’s “Innocence of Muslims” Copyright
Decision, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.trademarkandcopyrightlaw
blog.com/2014/02/nine-thoughts-on-the-ninth-circuits-innocence-of-muslims-copyright-decision/.
33 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 932.
34 Id.; see generally 17 U.S.C. § 512.
35 Alexander, supra note 23.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 786 F.3d. 733 (9th Cir.
2015) (en banc).
39 Corynne McSherry, Ninth Circuit Doubles Down in Garcia v. Google, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (July 11, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/ninth-circuit-doubles-down-in-gar
cia-v-google.
40 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 933 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1096
(9th Cir. 2002)).
5
Nicolopulos: Garcia v. Google, Inc.
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2016
37275-ggl_46-1 Sheet No. 43 Side B      01/13/2016   11:44:49
37275-ggl_46-1 Sheet No. 43 Side B      01/13/2016   11:44:49
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GGL\46-1\GGL104.txt unknown Seq: 6 29-DEC-15 11:15
54 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
A. AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT
Plaintiffs in copyright suits may seek two different types of injunc-
tions: preliminary and permanent.41 Preliminary injunctions are granted
at an early stage in the lawsuit, to avoid any more conduct by the defen-
dant that will harm the plaintiff.42  Courts must consider four factors to
grant a preliminary injunction: “a plaintiff’s likely success on the merits,
the likelihood that irreparable harm will result if an injunction doesn’t
issue, the balance of equities and the public interest.”43 At the close of a
case, the court may grant a permanent injunction if the plaintiff has suc-
cessfully proven infringement.44  To obtain a permanent injunction, the
plaintiff must show: (1) he/she has suffered an irreparable injury, (2)
damages will not compensate for the injury, (3) the balance of the hard-
ships demonstrates that equitable relief is warranted, and (4) the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.45 The United
States Supreme Court stated that in some situations, as with a parody, an
injunction might not be appropriate because there may be sufficient crea-
tivity in the defendant’s work and a strong public interest in keeping that
work available.46
The district court in Garcia only considered the first two factors for
preliminary injunction, and based on its analysis the court found against
Garcia.47  To succeed on the merits, Garcia needed to have an indepen-
dent copyright interest in the film, and the writer and director could not
own an interest in the film as a work for hire, nor could the writer and
director have an implied license to use her performance.48
By reversing the district court’s opinion, the Ninth Circuit provided
Garcia with a mandatory injunction to remove the trailer from You-
Tube.49 Mandatory preliminary injunctions go beyond the “status quo
pendente lite” and are “particularly disfavored.”50  Mandatory injunc-
tions bear a higher degree of scrutiny and require courts to be “extremely
41 17 U.S.C.A. § 502 (West 2015).
42 ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF COPYRIGHT LAW 407 (West
2010).
43 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 933.
44 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 42 at 408.
45 Id.
46 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994); see also
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 42 at 18.
47 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 933.
48 Id.
49 See Garcia, 766 F.3d at 940.
50 Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994).
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cautious”51 and “deny such relief ‘unless the facts and law clearly favor
the moving party.’”52 The court must review a district court’s decision
for abuse of discretion and may only reverse the decision if it is found
illogical or implausible.53  The Ninth Circuit granted an en banc review
and corrected its error in issuing a mandatory injunction because Garcia
was not an author of her performance, and the irreparable harm she suf-
fered was not the type for which a mandatory injunction was intended to
remedy.
B. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution
provides the basic subject matter protected by federal copyright law.54
The 1976 Copyright Act (the Act) provides further guidelines for copy-
rightable material: “all works of authorship are protected under the fed-
eral copyright law from the moment they are fixed in a tangible medium
of expression.”55 To avoid numerous lawsuits over copyright interests,
Congress enacted the DMCA in 1988, which gives online service provid-
ers a “safe harbor” from liability for copyright infringement caused by its
users.56 This “safe harbor” provides a “notice-and-takedown” system that
places the burden on the copyright owner to notify service providers
when a user commits copyright infringement.57 The service provider is
then supposed to intervene.58 Congress intended to create a rule where
users who upload infringing files are liable, and the web host is liable
only if it fails to respond to the takedown.59 The issue with this process is
that nothing will be done if the web host does not think the person claim-
ing infringement has a copyright interest or that any infringement has
taken place. Google denied the eight notice-and-takedown orders Garcia
filed because the company did not believe she was the owner of the
copyright.
Before a person can file a suit for copyright infringement, he or she
must first make and attempt to register for copyright. If that attempt is
51 Id. at 1319.
52 Id. at 1320 (citations omitted) (citing another source).
53 United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009).
54 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 42 at 18.
55 Id.  at 7?8.
56 Eric Goldman, How the DMCA’s Online Copyright Safe Harbor Failed, TECH. & MKRT.
BLOG (June 1, 2014), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/06/how-the-dmcas-online-copy
right-safe-harbor-failed.htm.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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unsuccessful, then the “owner” can proceed with the suit.60An exclusive
copyright owner can sue for the infringement of that particular right.61
Copyright protection exists “in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, not known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”62
Works of authorship, within the meaning of copyright law, includes
literary, musical, dramatic, chorographical, pictorial graphic, sculptural,
audiovisual, architectural works, and sound recordings.63  While these
categories do not set the ultimate boundaries of what is copyrightable
material, they are illustrative.64 A work must be “original” for copyright
to protect it, yet Congress did not provide a definition of what it is to be
original.65 Case law has indicated “original” means “the work was inde-
pendently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works),
and it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”66  Thus, an
independent creation is original if it is created “from scratch” and has
some minimal degree of creativity.67
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF GARCIA V. GOOGLE, INC.
A. APPEAL TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE ERRORS IN ITS DECISION
Garcia centers on whether Garcia, as an actor, had a copyright claim
at all. The Ninth Circuit’s 2014 opinion did not assess each of the ele-
ments correctly when it decided Garcia was likely to succeed on the mer-
its of her case. A plaintiff must first “establish that he is likely to succeed
on the merits” of her copyright claim to receive a preliminary injunc-
tion.68  The district court and the Ninth Circuit’s 2014 opinion disagreed
on the assessment of this factor and as a result, the district court’s deci-
sion was reversed.69
60 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 42 at 127.
61 Id. at 363.
62 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2015). See also SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 42 at 18–19.
63 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2015).
64 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 42 at 19.
65 Id. at 20.
66 Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
67 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 42 at 20 and 26.
68 Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
69 Garcia v. Google. Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 940 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir.
2015) (en banc).
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1. Necessity of Work and Authorship to Invoke Copyright Interest
One of the main elements necessary to claim a copyright interest is
that the interest protected must be an “original work.”70  To guide the
assessment of what is a “work,” Congress named numerous examples of
copyrightable works, such as architectural works, motion pictures, liter-
ary works, and pictorial or sculptural works.71 Thus, a film itself is a
“work,” but is an actor’s role in that film a work?  This is a central issue
in the Garcia case.  A movie producer is motivated by the right to create
copies and movies, and is usually treated as creating works that exist
because of the incentives of copyright. Actors, however, have different
and less significant interests.72 A motion picture seems unlikely to be a
“collective work,” which is a combination of “separate and independent”
works.73 When it comes to a motion picture, most independent contribu-
tions are not “separate and independent,” but are meant to be “merged
into inseparable or independent parts of a unitary whole [of] joint
work[s].”74 Unfortunately, the Garcia court focused on the fact that be-
cause a film is typically a joint work, the Copyright Act is silent as to
whether a “copyright interest in a creative contribution to a work simply
disappears because the contributor doesn’t qualify as a joint author.”75
While still not discussing whether her role in the film as an actor consti-
tuted a “work,” the court determined that if the contribution was fixed,
then the question hinged on whether it was creative enough to warrant
protection.76
The Ninth Circuit panel presumed Garcia’s contribution was a
“work,” and focused its discussion on whether she was an author and if
her contribution was creative.77 However, if her contribution was not a
“work,” it should not be protected, and the analysis should end. When a
contributor has a “separate and independent” copyright in only a portion
of the film, it creates serious consequences for the owner of the copy-
right.78 The Copyright Act does not clearly provide that an actor’s role in
a film constitutes a copyrightable work, and as such, the law does not
70 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2015).
71 Id.
72 Rebecca Tushnet, Performance Anxiety: Copyright Embodied and Disembodied, 60 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 209, 223–24 (2013).
73 MARK S. LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 12:8 (2015).
74 Id.
75 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 933?34 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 786 F.3d 733 (9th
Cir. 2015) (en banc).
76 Id. at 934.
77 See generally Garcia, 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014).
78 Lee, supra note 73.
9
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clearly favor that Garcia’s part in Innocence of Muslims is a copyright-
able interest.79
Authorship is a requirement of copyright that is not only provided by
the Copyright Act, but it is also embedded in the U.S. Constitution.80 An
author is the person who began the work, “the ‘master mind.’ . . . [For a
film, this] would generally limit authorship to someone at the top of the
screen credits, sometimes the producer, sometimes the director, possibly
the star, or the screenwriter—someone who has artistic control.”81  Au-
thors of a copyrighted work have certain rights that are not afforded to
non-authors who have contributed to the work.82 A person must be an
author before an intention, if any, to merge contributions will matter.83
Courts have interpreted joint authorship narrowly to protect the
threat of people claiming some ownership in a film or play.84 Joint au-
thors share the right to a work, no matter how unequal their contributions
may be, and each person can license it without the consent of the other
authors.85 As a result, courts prefer to award authorship to one person.86
Generally, “the author is the party who actually creates the work; that is,
the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression enti-
tled to copyright protection.”87 Authorship is the difference between
what is within the subject matter of copyright and what is
copyrightable.88
If anyone was author or mastermind of this film, it was Youssef, not
Garcia. He was the author who could accept or reject contributions from
others.89 The dissent in the 2014 opinion claimed that Garcia’s interest, if
any, was part of a joint work, while the majority maintained joint works
only occur when authors intend for their works to be joined.90 Garcia did
not claim a copyright interest in Innocence of Muslims as a film, instead
she claimed an interest in her performance in the film.91  Thus, Garcia
disclaimed the intent required for joint works and there was no evidence
that Youssef intended to create a joint work.92 The parties did not form a
79 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 942 (Smith, J., dissenting).
80 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2015); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
81 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000).
82 Tushnet, supra note 72, at 225.
83 Id. at 226.
84 Id. at 225?26.
85 Id. at 222.
86 Id. at 223.
87 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
88 Tushnet, supra note 72, at 234.
89 Id. at 233.
90 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., dissenting), vacated,
786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
91 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 933 (majority opinion).
92 Id.
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mutual intent to create a joint work, so Garcia was just an actor in a
larger production.93 Even if Youssef had relinquished his ownership in
the film, Garcia would not have gained that authorship.94
The 2014 Ninth Circuit opinion wrote the authorship requirement
out of copyright law and replaced it with creativity and intent require-
ments, which was not Congress’ intent. The court asserted that “the au-
thor of a single poem does not necessarily become a co-author of the
anthology in which the poem is published.”95  Only “a minimal creative
spark [is] required by the Copyright Act and the Constitution.”96 Here,
the court has not explained how Garcia is still an author in her five-
second role if she is not an author of a joint work in her contribution to
the film. Garcia’s fraud claim does not give her a copyright interest, be-
cause she was not an author or a joint author.97  It is strange that so long
as the director did not intervene in the suit, Garcia could be entitled to
claim sole ownership in a film in which she appeared for five seconds
and did not author.98
2. Actors’ Rights Under Copyright Protection
Copyright protection should not extend to an actor’s performance
regardless of its embodiment in the original work.99 The expansion of
copyright has had a vast impact in the area of performance “as new tech-
nologies have made it possible to fix performances in records and films,
and as cultural change has propelled recorded music and audiovisual
works to the forefront of the copyright industries.”100  Before Garcia, the
Ninth Circuit had never held that an actress’s performance could be
copyrightable.101  Indeed, “[t]here is little case law or statutory authority
as to the position of performers as authors of an audiovisual work under
U.S. law.”102 The Copyright Act provides that “any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, re-
gardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
93 Tushnet, supra note 72, at 233.
94 Id.
95 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 934.
96 Garcia, 766 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.,
499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991)).
97 Tushnet, supra note 72, at 237.
98 Id. at 235.
99 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 942 (Smith, J., dissenting).
100 Tushnet, supra note 72, at 209.
101 The Annals of Copyright Number 1, supra note 12.
102 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 941(Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee
Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. Rev.
225, 300 (2001)).
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embodied” will not be included for protection for an original work of
authorship.103 An acting performance is most similar to what Congress
outlined as a “‘procedure’ or ‘process’ by which ‘an original work’ is
performed.”104 The Copyright Act differentiates a “work” from the per-
formance of a work and defines “perform a work” as “to recite, render,
play, dance, or act it.”105 Congress included a description of what it is to
“perform a work,” which makes it difficult to imagine that they also in-
tended that a performance also be protected by copyright.106
The underlying questions regarding performance and copyright are
how to identify the creative aspects that make the performance original,
and thus protectable, and how to distinguish the works from the elements
that make it fixed.107 Copyright law protects dramatic works, musical
works, movies, and audiovisual works; however, a performance itself is
not a category of work protected by copyright law.108  Although plays
and scripts are considered literary works and not performances, it is un-
derstood that they are meant to be performed.109 A performance is typi-
cally less fixed and less predictable than the categories for copyright
allow.110 Courts classify performances as single authorship because per-
formances are given less cultural value.111
Authorship rights are unlikely to result from a person reading a
script and performing it.112 Who owns, or is the author of, a performance
becomes an important question. To determine who is an author, courts
often look to customary roles in which “dramaturges and actors” are not
usually considered authors.113 While a person can have a copyright inter-
est without recognition by the Copyright Office, Garcia attempted to reg-
ister for a copyright as a performance, a category that the Copyright
Office does not recognize.114 However, the court gave little consideration
to this fact.
The Ninth Circuit in 2014 found that “an actor’s performance is
based on a script, the performance is likewise derivative of the script,
such that the actor might be considered to have infringed the screen-
103 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West 2015).
104 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 942 (Smith, J., dissenting).
105 17 U.S.C.A. §101 (West 2015).
106 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 942 (Smith, J. dissenting).
107 Tushnet, supra note 72, at 210.
108 Id. at 211.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 212.
112 Id. at 228.
113 Id.
114 Complaint at 4, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. 2:12-cv-08315-MWF-VBK (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4,
2012).
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writer’s copyright” protection.115 It is hard to imagine how it is plausible
for an actor like Garcia to have her own copyright interest, which is
infringed by the very film that her performance is fixed in.116 Garcia had
no creative control over the script from which she read or over her per-
formance.117 Garcia was not the originator of any ideas or concepts be-
cause Youssef provided the script, the equipment, and gave direction.118
Garcia merely acted out another person’s ideas and script, and “even if a
valuable contribution to the film,” her five-second appearance in the film
“does not make her an author.”119
An actor’s contribution to a movie is similar to a vocalist’s contribu-
tion to a musical recording.120 Garcia followed the script, she did not
write it, she did not add her words or thoughts to the film, and she used
her voice to speak the word on the script and her body to act the part in
the scene.121 An actor’s performance in a film is more related to the act
of singing than it is to a protected copyrightable work.122  “A voice is not
copyrightable. The sounds are not ‘fixed.’ What is put forward . . . here
is more personal than any work of authorship.”123 Though an entire song
is copyrightable, the singing of that song is not.124  Similarly, the record-
ing of a movie is copyrightable, but the acting performance in the movie
is not.125
In a film, there are many people who evince more creativity then
Garcia did, and by allowing her this right, the majority here created “an
impenetrable thicket of copyright.”126 The Ninth Circuit concluded that it
is not necessary to decide whether all actors have a copyrightable interest
in his or her movie performance and that, while it recognizes Garcia’s
interest is debatable, she is still likely to prevail.127  This decision creates
potential consequences for film and copyright owners by recognizing
that an actor who voluntarily performs in a film may possess a copyright
interest in the film.128  The decision set forth the idea that where there
115 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 786 F.3d. 733 (9th Cir.
2015) (en banc).
116 Greg Lastowka, RUTGERS INST. FOR INFO. POLICY, Garcia v. Google: Works Within Works
(Mar. 19, 2014), http://riipl.rutgers.edu/garcia-v-google-works-within-works/.
117 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 943 (Smith, J., dissenting).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 945.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).
124 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 945 (Smith, J., dissenting).
125 Id.
126 Alexander, supra note 23.
127 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 935 (majority opinion).
128 Lee, supra note 73.
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would have been an implied license to use an actor’s performance, any
notion of fraud can make that license disappear and the actor has control
to affect the release or distribution of the film as a whole.129
B. EN BANC HEARING AND DECISION
An order for a rehearing en banc was granted November 12, 2014130
by a majority vote of the non-recused active judges of the Ninth Cir-
cuit.131  En banc reviews are “typically reserved for cases the appellate
court finds particularly significant.”132  The order provides that the en
banc decision will hold and the previous opinion of the three-judge panel
will not be cited as precedent by any Ninth Circuit court.133 Many of the
arguments at the en banc hearing were made to the appeals court in Feb-
ruary 2014 and were reviewed above. This portion of the Note will focus
on the most notable, new arguments that were presented at the en banc
hearing.
1. Melding Works, Authorship, and Mandatory Injunction
The en banc hearing lasted about an hour and focused on whether
Garcia could have a copyright interest in her five-second performance in
the film and if the preliminary injunction was proper, which were two
issues that often melded.134 The court had many questions about the
“work” and “authorship” elements of copyright claims and the imposi-
tion of an injunction, which have been discussed in detail above.135
Garcia argued that because she was receiving death threats, she
would be irreparably harmed without an injunction.136  The court con-
ceded that even if this was so, irreparable harm was only one factor ad-
129 Id.
130 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014).
131 Alexandra Sadinsky, Note, Redefining En Banc Review in the Federal Courts of Appeals,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 2023 (2014). The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to exercise the limited
en banc review which does not actually consist of the full court. The Ninth Circuit consists of 27
active judges, though a limited en banc court only contains 11 of those judges.
132 Edvard Pettersson, Google Says Death Threats Don’t Trump Copyright, YouTube,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2014-12-15/google-says-death-
threats-don-t-trump-copyright-youtube.html.
133 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
134 Cathy Gellis, Celine Dion and Human Cannonballs: The Garcia v Google En Banc Oral
Argument, TECHDIRT (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141216/10362129451/ce
line-dion-human-cannonballs-garcia-v-google-en-banc-oral-argument.shtml.
135 Cindy Garcia v. Google, Inc., et al, Np. 12-57302, UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000
006884.
136 Gellis, supra note 134.
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dressed by the district court.137  In order to grant the injunction, the
district court needed to find that Garcia was likely to succeed on the
merits of her copyright claim against Google.138  The court struggled
with the question of how the district court was wrong when it decided
that Garcia did not have a copyright claim.139  Garcia had “expressly
disclaimed having a copyright in the final movie as a joint author.”140
Garcia argued that she owned a copyright interest in her performance
alone, conducted over three and a half days of filming, and not that she
owned a piece of the final film itself.141
The court rightfully struggled with the fact that Garcia claimed a
copyright in three and a half days of a performance, only five seconds of
which was fixed in a tangible medium of expression, as required by the
Copyright Act.142 The panel expressed skepticism about an actor claim-
ing copyright in her performance.  Judge McKeown asked Garcia if any
extra who was in the battle scene in Lord of the Rings could also claim to
have an independent copyright interest in a performance in a particular
scene.143 Garcia claimed that in this example, those people had agreed
expressly or impliedly that their performance would be part of the whole,
but Garcia did not consent to participate in what turned out to be Inno-
cence of Muslims.144  Garcia claimed that she was deceived and that de-
ception took away the agreement that her performance would be
incorporated into the whole, and thus, she retained her copyright interest
in her contribution.145 The court rightfully had issues with this argument
because it struggled to find the “work” needed for a copyright claim.
Garcia’s argument posed the question of whether actors could claim
copyright in their performance, and then also issue takedown notices to
intermediaries.146  The court noted that intermediaries would be “at risk
for thousands, millions of claims made after the fact” and intermediaries
would have to determine whether to remove the content or risk being
sued like Google.147  Garcia argued that the DMCA protects in-
termediaries by removing them from the dispute, which is between the
parties who posted the content.148  This would cause immense implica-
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Pettersson, supra note 132.
144 Gellis, supra note 134.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
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tions for intermediaries who are not as large and as well-funded as
Google, and the burden would be placed on intermediaries to judge
whether a five-second clip is copyrightable and would, in turn, require
the take-down of the entire content in order to properly protect the
intermediary.149
Google admitted that a person may have a separate copyright inter-
est in a performance, but asserted that Garcia did not possess that inter-
est.150  Google described Celine Dion singing a song in the movie
Titanic that was intended both to be a standalone work, as well as in-
cluded in the larger work of the film.151 Google explained the difference
between Dion and Garcia turns on the intent of the parties, “Garcia has
never alleged she had intended her performance to be an independent,
stand-alone work.”152  Garcia fought back on this example, claiming that
in her situation, she gave permission for her performance to be used in
one context, in Desert Warrior, but it was then used in another context
for which she did not give permission, in Innocence of Muslims.153  The
court questioned this, as well as whether copyright is the correct law to
recognize her injury.154
Garcia argued that the appellate court’s decision was a prohibitory
injunction because it restricted an action in the future by restricting fur-
ther infringement.155 Google argued, as Judge Smith did in the dissenting
opinion in 2014, that by changing the status quo, the appellate court is-
sued a mandatory injunction.156 The injunction resulted in the removal of
the speech and should require a stronger showing that removal was war-
ranted than Garcia had shown.157
The court acted out of sympathy in its original decision and misap-
plied copyright law to “fill a gap in legal remedies available in the
U.S.”158 If copyright in Garcia’s performance stands on deception by
Youssef, then what could stop any actor from claiming fraud and mis-
take, thus having a copyrightable interest in their performance?159 Gar-
cia’s association with the film is already widely known and any damage
the movie caused her has already been done.160  If the original ruling
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Pettersson, supra note 132.
153 Gellis, supra note 134.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Pettersson, supra note 132.
159 Gellis, supra note 134.
160 Id.
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stood, it would have created “floodgates to demands by minor players in
movies for the removal of their performances from the internet.”161
Without correction, this opinion would have confused the scope of copy-
right protection, and created the threat of an increase in meritless copy-
right claims and litigation by performers regardless of the size of their
contribution to the copyrighted work.162
2. En Banc Decision to Vacate its Original Ruling and Uphold
District Court’s Decision
The Ninth Circuit issued its en banc opinion on May 18, 2015, open-
ing its opinion with a direct message: “[t]he appeal teaches a simple les-
son – a weak copyright claim cannot justify censorship in the guise of
authorship.”163  The court found that, based on the requirements of the
Copyright Act, the Copyright Office’s rejection of Garcia’s application
for copyright, and the difference in Garcia’s copyright claim and the ac-
tual relief sought, the district court did not abuse its discretion denying
her request for a preliminary injunction.164  Thus, the court vacated the
2014 mandatory injunction against Google.165  The biggest issue with
Garcia’s copyright claim in her performance in Innocence of Muslims
was that she chose to bring a copyright-based claim.166  Garcia sought
“to impose speech restrictions under copyright laws meant to foster
rather than repress free expression,” the court compared this to “copy-
right cherry picking” that would allow any person who minimally con-
tributed to a film to claim copyright without actually meeting the
requirements of the Copyright Act.167
The court re-emphasized the standards required for a mandatory in-
junction, which requested Google take affirmative action to remove the
film from YouTube.168 Thus, it must be established, not that Garcia is
likely to succeed, but more specifically, that the “law and the facts
clearly favor her position.”169 The district court should deny relief where
the facts and law do not clearly favor the moving party, thus “mandatory
injunctions should not issue in ‘doubtful cases.’”170
161 Pettersson, supra note 132.
162 Id.
163 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
164 Id. at 737.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 740.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 741
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The en banc court found that the law and the facts did not clearly
favor Garcia’s claim to copyright in her five-second performance in In-
nocence of Muslims.171  Under the Copyright Act, the fixation must be
done “by or under the authority of the author.”172  As stated above,
“works of authorship” is intentionally left undefined under the Copyright
Act.173 As the court describes, “Innocence of Muslims is an audiovisual
work that is categorized as a motion picture and is derivative of the
script” and Garcia makes no claim to the copyright of the film or to the
script.174 The sole copyright claim she made is in her five-second per-
formance, which the Copyright Office rejected out of its longstanding
practice to deny actors the right to a copyright claim in their perform-
ances within a motion picture.175  The court further analyzed that a
“work” based on “some minimal level of creativity” would “fragment
copyright protection . . .  into many little pieces.”176  If every acting per-
formance was treated as an independent work, it would create a “logisti-
cal and financial nightmare,” and “it would turn a cast of thousands into
a new mantra: copyright of thousands.”177
The court further found that Garcia, herself, did not fix her perform-
ance into a tangible medium.178  Regardless of how Garcia’s perform-
ance is characterized, she played no role in its fixation.179 More
importantly, Garcia argues that she did not agree to the film as it aired as
Innocence of Muslims, thus she cannot claim that the film or her brief
appearance in it was fixed by her as an author or under her authority.180
The en banc court correctly concluded that the district court made no
error in its copyright analysis and the “issuance of the mandatory prelim-
inary injunction requires more than a possible or fairly debatable claim;
it requires a showing that the law ‘clearly favor[s]’ Garcia.”181 Garcia
has not shown that the law clearly favors her because the Copyright Of-
fice and the Copyright Act do not support her claim.182
The en banc court acknowledged it could have affirmed the district
court on the copyright issue alone, but it addressed the issue of irrepara-
171 Id at 747.
172 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2015).
173 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 741.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 742.
177 Id. at 743.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 744
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
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ble harm because of the extreme danger Garcia faced.183 The court rec-
ognized Garcia faced serious harms and threats, but it also recognized the
difference between the danger she faced, and her desires to remedy her
copyright claim.184 The original intention of copyright as set forth in Ar-
ticle I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution was for copyright to drive free
expression and to supply the “economic incentive to create and dissemi-
nate ideas.”185  Copyright was meant to protect the author’s commercial
interest, not to “protect secrecy, but to stimulate creation by protecting its
rewards.”186  There is no dispute Garcia faced emotional distress, harm
to her reputation, and death threats.187 This is the harm that she claimed
would have been avoided by the issuance of an injunction.188  The issue
lies with her search for relief under copyright law.189  Copyright law is
meant to encourage public access to the author’s creative work, and those
authors “cannot seek emotional distress damages under the Copyright
Act, because such damages are unrelated to the value and the marketabil-
ity of their works.”190  The en banc court ultimately held that under the
first two preliminary injunction factors, Garcia’s copyright claim was
doubtful and she faced no irreparable harm to her interests as an author,
thus the last two factors: the balance of equities and public interest were
not evaluated.191  By granting the takedown order, the panel “deprived
the public of the ability to view firsthand, and judge for themselves, a
film at the center of an international uproar.”192  The court reiterated that
the takedown order was a classic form of prior restraint, which is the
“most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights.”193
In June 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit de-
cided an issue of first impression and cited Garcia, finding that a direc-
tor’s contribution to a film is not “separate and independent” from the
film and the director’s contribution was not a “work of authorship” under
the protection of copyright.194 Even if there is disagreement on the out-
come of Garcia’s copyright interest in this case, it is likely that after the
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 745 (quoting Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2010)).
187 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 745.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 746.
192 Id. at 747.
193 Id.
194 Lewis R. Clayton, Controversial Film Tests Limits of Copyright Law, NAT’L LAW J. (July
13, 2015).
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Second Circuit’s concurrence, it will be difficult for courts to recognize
similar copyright claims.195 As the Ninth Circuit en banc decision ad-
dressed, if Garcia is entitled to any relief, it could be through privacy or
other tort law remedies, not copyright.196  Garcia’s real goal was to have
her association with the film removed and forgotten, but the “right to be
forgotten” is a right that the United States has yet to recognize, especially
in the realm of copyright law.197
III. POSSIBLE REMEDIES EXISTING OUTSIDE OF COPYRIGHT
The Ninth Circuit has made clear its decision regarding performers’
rights: performers do not have copyright claims solely by the existence
of their work in a film.198  The en banc court suggests Garcia may have
received the remedy she desired if the United States recognized the
“right to be forgotten,” as is recognized in foreign nations.199  The Euro-
pean Union Commission included the “right to be forgotten” under its
proposal for the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).200  The
GDPR aims to strengthen an individual’s control over their personal data
and to create legal certainty while minimizing administrative burdens for
corporations.201  The “right to be forgotten” evolved from the idea that
“privacy is fundamentally a personality right predicated on dignity, at-
tached to a person rather than to his or her property.”202
There are three interpretations of the “right to be forgotten:” (1) a
person has the right to delete information that he or she posted online, (2)
a person has the right to delete any information about his or herself that
others have posted online, and (3) a person has the right to remove any
information about his or herself regardless of its origin.203 The “right to
be forgotten” requires a controller of the content to erase personal data
and to urge third parties to remove links to the data in order to prevent it
195 Id.
196 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
197 Id. at 746?47.
198 Wayman Stodart, Garcia v Google and the Future of Actor’s Rights, JETLAW (June 18,
2015), http://www.jetlaw.org/2015/06/18/garcia-v-google-and-the-future-of-actors-rights/.
199 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 746?47.
200 Patricia Sanchez Abril & Jacqueline D. Lipton, The Right to Be Forgotten: Who Decides
What the World Forgets?, 103 KY. L.J. 363, 367 (2015).
201 Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to Be Forgotten to
Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 349, 366 (2015).
202 Abril & Lipton, supra note 200 at 366.
203 Ignacio Cofone, Google v. Spain: A Right to Be Forgotten?, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1, 2 (2015). See also Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 201 at 367 (explaining these three
interpretations are described as the right to have information erased after a preset period, the right to
a clean slate, and the right to be connected to present information and disconnected to outdated
information).
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from spreading further.204  Overall this right was meant to make sure the
economic interests of private companies, such as Google, would not out-
weigh the privacy rights of an individual.205  Under this right, a person
can request the removal of data based on a simple preference without
proving the data is harmful and in violation of personal rights.206 This
right does not distinguish between true and false information, so truthful
data that does not fit within the statutory exceptions can be
suppressed.207
There are four statutory exceptions meant to accommodate expres-
sion and the public’s right to know.208 Exceptions are established for: (1)
an exercise of freedom of expression, (2) public interest in the area of
public health, (3) historical, statistical, and scientific research purposes,
and (4) compliance with a legal obligation.209 If the United States devel-
oped a similar model, it is unlikely that Garcia would qualify for a le-
gally-recognized right to be forgotten.  As applied thus far, the “right to
be forgotten” is applied in response to personal information.  Garcia, on
the other hand, was not acting as herself when the video was uploaded to
YouTube, she was playing a part she was hired for.  Even though that
part was altered, it seems likely that given the above statutory exceptions
Innocence of Muslims could easily classify as an exercise of freedom of
expression or for historical purposes.  The video created uproar world-
wide and is now part of history.  Allowing a “right to be forgotten” for
her role would deny the world the ability to form opinions and ideas
surrounding the matter.210  This right would create a situation, which al-
lows for the existence of the video, but would make “it unavailable for
the public who look for it on search engines.”211
It is unlikely the “right to be forgotten” or anything similar will be
adopted in the United States.212 While the White House released the
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (Privacy Bill) proposal shortly after the
European Union Commission released the GDPR, the Privacy Bill does
not extend to a “right to be forgotten.”213 The Privacy Bill aims to make
stronger privacy protection for online users in order to stimulate eco-
204 Abril & Lipton, supra note 200 at 365.
205 Id. at 379.
206 Cofone, supra note 203 at 2–3.
207 Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 201 at 369.
208 Id. at 371.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 373.
211 Cofone, supra note 203 at 10.
212 Andrew R.W. Hughes, Does the United States Have an Answer to the European Right to
Be Forgotten?, LANDSLIDE, Sept./Oct. 2014, at 19.
213 Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 201 at 379.
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nomic growth.214 Under this bill, people have the right to control how
companies use their personal data and how that data is accessed, dissemi-
nated, and secured.215 This bill provides protection for how consumers’
information and data are processed, but provides no guidance for how
general information can be posted or re-posted among various domains.
The “right to be forgotten” has not gained leverage in the United States
due to its adverse relationship with the First Amendment.216  Some states
have made small steps toward the “right to be forgotten.”217 In Califor-
nia, there is a “right to be forgotten” for children, which allows children
to delete posts they made about themselves online, however it does not
extend to content written about them.218
There is a remedy that service providers can provide which would
give people the right to correct inaccurate, false, old, or inappropriate
data.219  Contextualization allows people to “correct and re-project their
images to society.”220  Under this model, Garcia could provide details
updating or explaining the out-of-context YouTube post. She would not
receive the result of erasing the information that she desired, but she
could have added information explaining that she had no part in Inno-
cence of Muslims as it was released.  Unfortunately, this is a feature that
separate host sites need to enact and Google has abandoned this op-
tion.221  Though this would not have given Garcia her desired result, it
could have provided her initial control over the video without the threat
of censorship.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit en banc panel correctly lifted the injunction find-
ing that Garcia did not have a copyright interest in her performance in
Innocence of Muslims. Copyright law is deeply rooted in American his-
tory to protect individuals’ unique creations. Injunctions should only be
granted when monetary damages will be insufficient to protect an
owner’s interest.  Before one can obtain an injunction, they must be the
owner of the copyright interest.  The Ninth Circuit correctly determined
that Garcia’s performance was not a work, that she was not an author of
her performance, and that she ultimately did not retain a copyright inter-
214 Id. at 377.
215 Id. at 378.
216 Id. at 379.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 380.
219 Id at 384.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 385.
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est that warranted removal of the entire film from the Internet.  While
there is no doubt Garcia suffered an injury, copyright protection is not
the correct avenue.  In today’s technologically driven world, where any-
one can become a filmmaker by uploading a video to the Internet, it is
possible that more people will assert injury due to inaccurate or image-
harming uploads.  Unless the legislature amends copyright protection or
adopts a variation of the “right to be forgotten,” which seems unlikely,
then claimants must seek redress through ordinary privacy and tort law in
which monetary damages must suffice.
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